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CASE COMMENT 
IF IT LOOKS LIKE A VESSEL: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
“REASONABLE OBSERVER” TEST FOR VESSEL STATUS 
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013) 
David R. Maass∗ 
What is a vessel? In maritime law, important rights and duties turn 
on whether something is a vessel. For example, the owner of a vessel 
can limit his liability for damages caused by the vessel under the 
Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act,1 and an injured seaman who is 
a member of the crew of a vessel can claim remedies under the Jones 
Act.2 Under the general maritime law, a vendor who repairs or supplies 
a vessel may acquire a maritime lien over the vessel.3 In these and other 
areas, vessel status plays a crucial role in setting the limits of admiralty 
jurisdiction. Clear boundaries are important because with admiralty 
jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law—the 
specialized body of statutory and judge-made law that governs maritime 
commerce and navigation.4 
The Dictionary Act5 defines “vessel” for purposes of federal law. Per 
the statute, “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft 
or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means 
of transportation on water.”6 The statute’s language sweeps broadly, and 
courts have, at times, interpreted the statute to apply even to unusual 
structures that were never meant for maritime transport. “No doubt the 
three men in a tub would also fit within our definition,” one court 
acknowledged, “and one probably could make a convincing case for 
Jonah inside the whale.”7 At other times, however, courts have focused 
on the structure’s purpose, excluding structures that were not designed 
for maritime transport.8 In Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.,9 the 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D., 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law; A.B., 2009, Princeton 
University. Thanks to the members and staff of the Florida Law Review, and to our dedicated 
faculty advisor, Professor Dennis Calfee. Thanks also to Professors Mark Fenster and Anthony 
Cuva for helpful comments and encouragement. 
 1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006). 
 2. Id. § 30104(a).  
 3. See, e.g., Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 869, 2010 AMC 
1414, 1418–19 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 4. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864–65, 1986 
AMC 2027, 2032 (1986). 
 5. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75, 1983 AMC 2208 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 8. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140, 1142 
(5th Cir. 1978) (citing The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 30, 2010 AMC 542, 549 (1903)) 
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United States Supreme Court embraced the statutory definition and held 
that a vessel need only be “practically capable” of maritime transport.10 
But Stewart left open an important question: Should courts consider the 
owner’s intended use for the structure in determining whether it counts 
as a vessel under the statute? 
Earlier this Term, in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,11 the Supreme 
Court answered that question and held that courts should consider only 
objective facts about the structure’s design and activities.12 In the 
process, the Court announced a new test for vessel status based on the 
concept of the reasonable observer.13 This Comment begins by outlining 
the case’s facts and procedural history, then pulls back to survey the law 
of vessel status. Against this background, this Comment discusses the 
Supreme Court’s decision, and criticizes the Supreme Court’s new test 
for vessel status as misguided and unworkable. 
This case began with a confrontation between a city government and 
the owner of an unusual floating structure. Fane Lozman bought the 
floating, gray, two-story structure in 2002, then had it towed from near 
Fort Myers, Florida, to North Bay Village, Florida.14 There Lozman 
lived in the structure until a hurricane struck in 2005, and then in March 
2006 he had it towed again to Riviera Beach, Florida.15 Beginning in 
March 2006, Lozman lived in the structure while docking at the city 
marina in Riviera Beach.16 The city marina lies on the Intracoastal 
Waterway near the Port of Palm Beach and offers about ninety slips.17 
In June 2007, the Riviera Beach City Council passed a resolution 
adopting a new dockage agreement and new rules for the city marina.18 
                                                                                                                     
(“In determining what is a vessel, we consider the purpose for which the craft is constructed and 
the business in which it is engaged.”). 
 9. 543 U.S. 481, 2005 AMC 609 (2005). 
 10. See id. at 488–95, 2005 AMC at 613–20. 
 11. 133 S. Ct. 735, 2013 AMC 1 (2013). 
 12. Id. at 740–41, 744–45, 2013 AMC at 4–5, 11–12. 
 13. See id. at 741, 2013 AMC at 5. 
 14. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel 
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1262, 2011 AMC 2891, 2892 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
 15.  Id. at 1262, 2011 AMC at 2892. 
 16.  Id. Lozman and the city had a contentious history. Some praised him as a dedicated 
community activist, but city officials and some residents regarded him as a nuisance. See Liz 
Balmaseda, Ex-Marine Has Waged Long, Obsessive One-Man War over City Marina, and Has 
No Plans to Quit, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/ 
news/news/ex-marine-has-waged-long-obsessive-one-man-war-ove/nL6Jn. Lozman sometimes 
appeared at council meetings to complain about city policies and harangue city officials until 
police removed him from the podium. Id. 
 17. See Amenities, THE CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH MARINA, http://rivierabeachmarina.com/ 
?page_id=8 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
 18. Unnamed Gray Vessel, 649 F.3d at 1263, 2011 AMC at 2893–94. 
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Lozman never signed the new dockage agreement and he did not 
comply with the new rules.19 
On April 20, 2009, the City brought an action in rem against the 
structure in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida and moved for an arrest warrant under Rule C.20 The district 
court issued the warrant and Lozman’s structure was removed from the 
marina.21 In its complaint, the City sought to enforce maritime liens 
against the structure.22 Maritime liens evolved with special attachment 
and priority rules to serve the needs of maritime commerce.23 In these 
cases, the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction over an in rem 
proceeding depends on there being a maritime lien, and for there to be a 
lien, there must be a vessel to which the lien can attach.24 Without a 
vessel, there can be no lien, and no admiralty jurisdiction.25 Lozman, 
therefore, tried to defeat the federal court’s jurisdiction by arguing that 
his floating residence was not a “vessel” within the meaning of the 
statute.26 On the City’s motion for summary judgment, however, the 
district court held that the structure was a vessel and, therefore, the 
court’s exercise of admiralty jurisdiction was proper.27 
In its decision, the district court analogized Lozman’s floating 
structure to the structure in Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp.,28 
which was held to be a vessel.29 The structure in Pleason was originally 
built by the Navy as a salvage vessel, but a later owner converted it into 
a stationary shrimp-processing facility.30 Although the structure had no 
propulsion and no steering, the Pleason court held that it was still a 
vessel because it could be used as a means of maritime transport under 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 1263–64, 2011 AMC at 2894–95. 
 20. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two Story Vessel 
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, No. 09-80594-CIV, 2009 WL 8575966, at *1 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009); see FED. R. CIV. P. C. 
 21. Unnamed Gray, 2009 WL 8575966, at *1. 
 22. The City sought to enforce maritime liens for necessaries, including dockage fees; and 
maritime trespass, for damages stemming from Lozman’s failure to remove the structure from 
the marina. See id. at *2. 
 23. See Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 869–72, 2010 AMC 
1414, 1418–21 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the purpose of maritime liens and the history of 
maritime-lien legislation). 
 24. See id. at 872, 2010 AMC at 1423 (“Because a district court’s authority to arrest a ship 
and to adjudicate an in rem proceeding against it requires the attachment of a maritime lien, both 
the lien and the district court’s jurisdiction depend on a ship’s status as a ‘vessel.’”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Unnamed Gray, 2009 WL 8575966, at *3. 
 27. Id. at *4. 
 28. 221 F.2d 621, 1955 AMC 794 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 29. Id. at 623, 1955 AMC at 796; Unnamed Gray, 2009 WL 8575966, at *4. 
 30. Pleason, 221 F.2d at 622, 1955 AMC at 795. 
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tow.31 The district court in this case believed that Lozman failed to 
distinguish his floating residence from that structure, pointing out 
characteristics the two structures shared. “Like the vessel in Pleason, 
the Defendant vessel here was moored to the dock with cables, received 
power from the land, and needed to be towed in order to be moved.”32 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, 
holding that the structure fit the statutory definition as interpreted by 
that circuit’s decisions.33 The court rejected Lozman’s argument that the 
structure would not qualify as a vessel under state law as misplaced.34 
The existence of federal admiralty jurisdiction does not depend on 
vessel status under state law but on the federal statutory definition.35 
The court pointed to Pleason as well as to another decision in which the 
former Fifth Circuit held that a houseboat without propulsion used as a 
residence in a marina was still a vessel.36 The Eleventh Circuit rejected 
three of Lozman’s arguments against vessel status. First, Lozman 
argued that the structure was not practically capable of transportation 
because it could not be towed without suffering serious damage.37 The 
court found no factual support for this argument.38 Second, Lozman 
argued that the structure’s design and materials made it more like a 
traditional residence than a vessel.39 The court found that despite its 
unusual design the structure had maritime capability.40 Third, Lozman 
argued that the structure was not certified by the state or the U.S. Coast 
Guard.41 The court held that this was not a prerequisite for vessel 
status.42 Having rejected Lozman’s arguments, the court held that the 
structure was a vessel.43 Thus, both the district court and the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 623, 1955 AMC at 796–97. 
 32. Unnamed Gray, 2009 WL 8575966, at *4. 
 33. City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel 
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1269, 2011 AMC 2891, 2892 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
 34. See id. at 1266 n.6, 2011 AMC at 2898 n.6. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1266–67, 2011 AMC at 2899–2900 (discussing Pleason, 221 F.2d 621, and 
Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, Serial #SC-40-2860-3-62, 390 F.2d 596, 1968 
AMC 336 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 37. Brief for Claimant-Appellant at 13–14, 23–24, City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain 
Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259 
(11th Cir. 2011). 
 38. Unnamed Gray, 649 F.3d at 1268, 2011 AMC at 2902–03. 
 39. Brief for Claimant-Appellant, supra note 37, at 16–17. 
 40. Unnamed Gray, 649 F.3d at 1268–69, 2011 AMC at 2903–04. 
 41. Brief for Claimant-Appellant, supra note 37, at 17–18. 
 42. Unnamed Gray, 649 F.3d at 1269, 2011 AMC at 2904. 
 43. Id. The court also criticized the owner’s reliance on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusements Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 1995 AMC 2038 (5th Cir. 
1995), noting that the Eleventh Circuit had rejected that decision’s reasoning in Board of 
Commissioners v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008), as inconsistent 
4
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Circuit agreed that Lozman’s structure was a vessel within the meaning 
of the statute. To fully explain how the Supreme Court resolved this 
case, this Comment now discusses the legal background of vessel status. 
The Lozman Court would not be writing on a clean slate. Before 
Lozman, the Supreme Court last addressed vessel status in Stewart v. 
Dutra Construction Co.44 Stewart involved a massive dredge hired by 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as part of Boston’s “Big Dig” 
construction project.45 Although the dredge possessed “certain 
characteristics common to seagoing vessels, such as a captain and crew, 
navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area,” it had “only 
limited means of self-propulsion,” relying on tugs to travel long 
distances.46 Nonetheless, the Court held unanimously that the dredge 
was a vessel because it was “practically capable of maritime 
transportation.”47 The fact that the dredge generally stayed in one place 
unless it was moved did not negate its status as a vessel. 
The Stewart Court rejected a more restrictive interpretation of the 
statute based on two earlier cases, Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co.48 and 
Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co.49 
Cope and Evansville denied vessel status to a drydock and a wharfboat 
because they were fixed structures.50 But the Court distinguished the 
dredge in Stewart on the basis that it was only temporarily stationary, 
while the drydock and wharfboat were permanently rooted in place.51 
Thus, the Stewart Court explained, the earlier cases stand for a narrow 
proposition. “Cope and Evansville did no more than construe § 3 in light 
of the distinction drawn by the general maritime law between watercraft 
temporarily stationed in a particular location and those permanently 
affixed to shore or resting on the ocean floor.”52 The latter are not 
vessels because they cannot be used for transportation.53 “Simply put, a 
watercraft is not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in any 
meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise 
rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.”54 
                                                                                                                     
with Stewart. Unnamed Gray, 649 F.3d at 1267, 2011 AMC at 2901; see also infra notes 56–69 
and accompanying text. 
 44. 543 U.S. 481, 2005 AMC 609 (2005). 
 45. Id. at 484, 2005 AMC at 610. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 497, 2005 AMC at 620. 
 48. 119 U.S. 625, 2002 AMC 2694 (1887). 
 49. 271 U.S. 19, 1926 AMC 684 (1926). 
 50. Cope, 119 U.S. at 627–30, 2002 AMC at 2696–98; Evansville, 271 U.S. at 22, 1926 
AMC at 686–87. 
 51. Stewart, 543 U.S. at 493, 2005 AMC at 617. 
 52. Id. at 493–94, 2005 AMC at 617. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 494, 2005 AMC at 617. 
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Although Stewart analyzed vessel status in the context of seaman 
claims, the decision influenced many areas of maritime law.55 
In sum, Stewart tied the vessel status inquiry more closely to the 
words of the statute, shifting the focus of the inquiry from purpose to 
capability. But Stewart failed to answer an important question: Should 
courts consider the owner’s intended use for the structure in 
determining vessel status? The only clue came in the form of an 
ambiguous citation to a Fifth Circuit case, Pavone v. Mississippi 
Riverboat Amusements Corp.56 In Pavone, the Fifth Circuit held that a 
floating casino was not a vessel because it was either removed from 
navigation, or employed as a work platform, or both.57 In its opinion, 
the court attached some weight to the fact that the structure was built 
and used as a floating restaurant and casino.58 Even though it was 
moved once to avoid a hurricane, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, that 
“movement was purely incidental to [its] primary purpose of physically 
supporting a dockside casino structure.”59 Thus, the structure was not a 
vessel.60 The problem was that Stewart seemed to reject any test based 
on the structure’s “primary purpose.”61 Therefore, although Stewart 
cited Pavone, it was unclear how much of Pavone’s reasoning the 
Stewart Court actually endorsed.62 After Stewart, lower courts reached 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See David W. Robertson, How the Supreme Court’s New Definition of “Vessel” Is 
Affecting Seaman Status, Admiralty Jurisdiction, and Other Areas of Maritime Law, 39 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 115, 152–56 (2008). 
 56. 52 F.3d 560, 1995 AMC 2038 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Ross I. Landau, Comment, A 
Theoretical Possibility of Navigation: An Analysis of the Vessel Status of Watercraft-Casinos in 
the Wake of Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 249, 257 (2007) (“Perhaps no 
aspect of the Stewart opinion has proven more problematic than its citation, seemingly with 
approval, to Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp.”). 
 57. Pavone, 52 F.3d at 568–70, 1995 AMC at 2043–48. 
 58. Id. at 570, 1995 AMC at 2047–48. 
 59. Id. at 570, 1995 AMC at 2048. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 495, 2005 AMC 609, 618 (2005) 
(“Section 3 requires only that a watercraft be ‘used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on water’ to qualify as a vessel. It does not require that a watercraft be used 
primarily for that purpose.”). The primary purpose test was well-established in Fifth Circuit 
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 293, 1991 AMC 
506, 511 (5th Cir. 1990), and support for it can be found in early Supreme Court precedent. See 
The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 30, 2010 AMC 542, 549 (1903) (“In fact, neither size, 
form, equipment nor means of propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of 
[admiralty] jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft was constructed, 
and the business in which it is engaged.”) (emphasis added). 
 62. One student commentator argues that the citation should be interpreted narrowly to 
approve Pavone’s result, but not its reasoning. See Landau, supra note 56, at 260  (describing 
Pavone’s reasoning as “patently incompatible” with Stewart). Another defends Pavone’s 
broader consistency with Stewart. See Stephen W. Grant, Jr., Comment, Calling All Bets on 
Gaming Boat Vessel Status: An Analysis of How the Fifth Circuit Is Consistent with Stewart v. 
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very different results about the meaning of this citation. 
In De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co.,63 the Fifth Circuit 
interpreted the citation to its Pavone decision as an approval of that 
circuit’s consideration of the owner’s intent.64 De La Rosa held that a 
moored casino boat was not a vessel even though it was “physically 
capable” of transportation because the boat’s owners intended to use it 
exclusively as a platform for gaming.65 In other words, the owner’s 
intent outweighed the existence of physical characteristics that would 
have supported vessel status.66 
The Eleventh Circuit drew the opposite conclusion. In Board of 
Commissioners v. M/V Belle of Orleans, that court specifically rejected 
the Fifth Circuit’s purposive approach as inconsistent with Stewart.67 
The Eleventh Circuit held that Stewart left no room for considering the 
owner’s intended use for the structure or, indeed, anything else about 
the structure’s purpose.68 “The owner’s intentions with regard to a boat 
are analogous to the boat’s ‘purpose,’ and Stewart clearly rejected any 
definition of ‘vessel’ that relies on such a purpose.”69 
Thus, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits staked out different positions 
on the owner intent issue, even though both claimed to be following 
Stewart. With lower courts split over how to apply Stewart, the stage 
                                                                                                                     
Dutra Construction Co., 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 331, 340–44 (2009). 
 63. 474 F.3d 185, 2006 AMC 2997 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 64. See id. at 188 & n.2, 2006 AMC at 2999 & n.2  (arguing that the Pavone citation 
justified denying vessel status to a moored casino boat based in part on the owner’s intent). But 
see Holmes v. Atl. Sounding Co., 437 F.3d 441, 449, 2006 AMC 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing that Stewart mandated changes in the Fifth Circuit’s more restrictive vessel 
jurisprudence in the context of seaman status); Larissa N. Sanchez, Note, Following the “Vessel 
Status” Quo: The Fifth Circuit Reluctantly Modifies Its Vessel Jurisprudence in Holmes v. 
Atlantic Sounding Co., 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 435, 443 (2006) (“In Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding 
Co., the Fifth Circuit recognized that its prior vessel jurisprudence was inconsistent with the 
Stewart decision.”). 
 65. De La Rosa, 474 F.3d at 187, 2006 AMC at 2998–99. 
 66. De La Rosa has received strong criticism for its consideration of the owner’s intent. 
See Robertson, supra note 55, at 139 (“De La Rosa—holding that a physically operational 
casino boat is a non-vessel as a matter of law merely because of the owner’s announced 
intentions to sail no more—was wrongly decided.”) (footnote omitted). Another commentator 
defends De La Rosa, however, pointing out that the Fifth Circuit only considered the owner’s 
intent as one among many factors. See Grant, supra note 62, at 351 (“The De La Rosa court 
performed a factual analysis of the casino’s physical characteristics and considered owner intent 
only as further evidence that the vessel was indeed withdrawn from navigation.”). 
 67. Bd. of Comm’rs v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2008). Belle 
of Orleans also declined to follow an interesting approach suggested in dicta by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1311. That approach would have considered owner 
intent as a factor based on an analogy to the distinction between domicile and residence. See 
Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1016, 2006 AMC 1290, 1295–96 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 68. Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d at 1311. 
 69. Id. 
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was set for vessel status to return to the United States Supreme Court. 
In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,70 the Supreme Court held 7–2, 
in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, that Lozman’s structure was 
not a vessel because a “reasonable observer” would not consider the 
structure “to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people 
[and] things on water.”71 The Lozman Court began by rejecting the 
Eleventh Circuit’s test as overbroad.72 In the Court’s view, that test 
would embrace essentially all floating structures.73 But some floating 
structures are not vessels because those structures are neither designed 
for maritime transport nor actually used for that purpose. Therefore, a 
more discriminating test was needed. 
Instead of applying the Stewart test, however, the Supreme Court 
introduced a new test based on the concept of the reasonable observer.74 
Would a reasonable observer consider the structure to be “designed to 
[any] practical degree for carrying people [and] things over water?”75 
Applying this test to Lozman’s structure, the Court found no objective 
characteristics that would indicate to a reasonable observer that the 
structure was designed for maritime transport.76 The structure had no 
means of steering or propulsion.77 It could travel only under tow, and 
even then with difficulty.78 Its living spaces were not adapted to 
maritime needs; it had doors and windows, not hatches and portholes.79 
In sum, Lozman’s structure lacked sufficient objective characteristics to 
persuade a reasonable observer that the structure was “designed to [any] 
practical degree for carrying people [and] things over water.”80 
Therefore, it was not a vessel.81 Of course, the Court acknowledged that 
a structure that was actually used for maritime transport could qualify as 
a vessel even though a reasonable observer would not consider the 
structure to be designed for that purpose.82 The Court nonetheless held 
that any actual use in this case—two trips under tow, on which the 
structure carried, at most, a few people and some furniture—was 
insufficient to make the structure a vessel.83 
                                                                                                                     
 70. 133 S. Ct. 735, 2013 AMC 1 (2013). 
 71. Id. at 739, 2013 AMC at 2. 
 72. See id. at 740–41, 2013 AMC at 4–5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 741, 2013 AMC at 5. 
 75. Id. at 741, 2013 AMC at 6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 740, 2013 AMC at 5. 
 82. See id. at 746, 2013 AMC at 13–14. 
 83. Id. As the dissent argued, however, this holding is in tension with the practical 
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The Court then explained why the reasonable observer test fits the 
statute’s text, precedent, and purposes. First, the reasonable observer 
test respects the statute’s text because the words of the statute point 
toward the structure’s function or purpose.84 A “contrivance” is 
something designed for a purpose, and a “watercraft” is something 
designed specifically to carry people and things on water.85 The 
reasonable observer test similarly focuses on the structure’s purpose. 
Second, the reasonable observer test validates existing precedents 
because most cases have held that structures that are neither designed 
for maritime transport nor actually used for that purpose are not 
vessels.86 In Stewart, for example, the Supreme Court held that the 
dredge was a vessel because it was used at least sometimes to transport 
workers and equipment.87 But in Evansville, the Court held that the 
wharfboat was not a vessel because it was neither designed for 
transportation nor used for that purpose.88 “The basic difference, we 
believe, is that the dredge was regularly, but not primarily, used (and 
designed in part to be used) to transport workers and equipment over 
water while the wharfboat was not designed (to any practical degree) to 
serve a transportation function and did not do so.”89 The reasonable 
observer test makes sense of these cases. Third, the reasonable observer 
test serves the statute’s underlying purposes because it extends 
admiralty jurisdiction to cases in which reasons exist for applying 
maritime law.90 For example, maritime law includes special attachment 
procedures to guard against the risk that a vessel will flee to avoid 
arrest.91 But a structure that is not designed for maritime transport 
presents little risk of escape; therefore, there is less reason to apply 
maritime law to that structure.92 Thus, the Court argued, the statute’s 
text, precedent, and purposes all support the reasonable observer test.93 
                                                                                                                     
capability test. Id. at 752, 2013 AMC at 22 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority fails to 
explain how a craft that apparently did carry people and things over water for long distances was 
not ‘practically capable’ of maritime transport.”). 
 84. Id. at 741, 2013 AMC at 6–7. 
 85. Id. at 741–42, 2013 AMC at 6–7. 
 86. Id. at 742, 2013 AMC at 7. 
 87. Id. at 742, 2013 AMC at 7–8 (citing Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484–
85, 2005 AMC 609, 610, 614–19 (2005)). 
 88. Id. at 742, 2013 AMC at 8 (citing Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero 
Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 20–22, 1926 AMC 684 (1926)). 
 89. Id. at 743, 2013 AMC at 8–9. 
 90. Id. at 743–44, 2013 AMC at 10. 
 91. Id. at 744, 2013 AMC at 10. 
 92. See id. 
 93. The Court also noted that its holding was consistent with state laws governing floating 
homes. Id. at 744, 2013 AMC at 10–11 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.270(5)(b)(ii) 
(West 2012)). Therefore, the reasonable observer test has the additional benefit that it promotes 
harmony between related state and federal laws. Id. at 744, 2013 AMC at 11. 
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Finally, the Supreme Court defended the reasonable observer test 
against two serious objections. First, the reasonable observer test does 
not inject a subjective element, the Court explained, because the test 
considers only objective facts about the structure’s physical 
characteristics and activities.94 The test leaves no room for debate about 
the owner’s private intentions. Second, the reasonable observer test will 
not create uncertainty in admiralty jurisdiction because the test resolves 
borderline cases at least as well as any other test.95 It may not be 
perfect, the Court conceded, but the reasonable observer test is both 
workable and consistent with the statute.96 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy.97 While the dissent agreed with the majority’s reading of the 
Court’s precedents, it objected to the majority’s formulation of the 
reasonable observer test and the majority’s application of that test to the 
facts in this case.98 The dissent accepted that the Eleventh Circuit’s test 
was overbroad, that the owner’s subjective intentions should not matter, 
and that what does matter is the structure’s objective purpose.99 The 
dissent parted ways with the majority, however, when it came to the 
reasonable observer test.100 In the dissent’s view, that test would make 
vessel status more subjective and uncertain.101 Moreover, as applied by 
the majority, the reasonable observer test threatened to upset settled 
lower court precedents.102 Aside from the reasonable observer test, the 
dissent’s more basic concern was that the Court did not have enough 
information about the structure to make a decision.103 Rather than 
remand the case, the majority chose to focus on the limited information 
available, and in the process it distorted the vessel status inquiry.104 
As the dissent pointed out, no prior decision had suggested that 
courts should evaluate vessel status from the standpoint of a reasonable 
observer.105 In fact, the majority’s reasonable observer test closely 
resembles the “objective function” test urged by the United States in its 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744–45, 2013 AMC at 11–12. 
 95. See id. at 745, 2013 AMC at 12–13. 
 96. Id. The Court also rejected calls to remand the case for more fact-finding. The only 
specific factual issue raised by the dissent concerned the extent of the damage suffered by the 
structure under tow, which would only have reinforced the Court’s finding that the structure was 
not a vessel. Id. at 754, 2013 AMC at 25 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Therefore, the majority 
argued, remand was unnecessary. Id. at 745–46, 2013 AMC at 13 (majority opinion). 
 97. Id. at 748, 2013 AMC at 17 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 751, 2013 AMC at 21. 
 101. Id. at 751–52, 2013 AMC at 21–23. 
 102. Id. at 753, 2013 AMC at 24–25. 
 103. Id. at 752–53, 2013 AMC at 23–24. 
 104. Id. at 754–55, 2013 AMC at 25–26. 
 105. Id. at 748–49, 2013 AMC at 17. 
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brief as amicus curiae supporting petitioner. In its brief, the Government 
argued that the statute and the Court’s precedents show that a structure’s 
purpose or function is relevant to vessel status, but only to the extent 
that purpose is evident in the structure’s objective characteristics.106 
Thus, purpose can be determined without considering the owner’s 
subjective intent. “Just as the owner’s state of mind is not needed to 
determine how a structure is actually ‘used,’ neither does it govern what 
the structure is ‘capable’ of being used as. Instead, a structure’s 
capabilities are inherent in its own attributes and circumstances.”107 The 
reasonable observer test embodies this objective function approach 
because it focuses on the structure’s purpose but abstracts away the 
owner’s subjective intent. It makes sense that when the Court set out to 
describe this approach it reached for a familiar common law device—
that “excellent but odious character”108—the reasonable person. The 
reasonable observer serves a similar objectifying purpose in other areas 
of the law. For example, in contract law, courts evaluate manifestations 
of assent from the perspective of a reasonable observer.109 Whatever his 
private wishes, did the person’s actions show an intent to be bound by 
the contract?110 Here, the reasonable person similarly excludes the 
owner’s private wishes. Thus, although it does not expressly disapprove 
De La Rosa, which emphasized the owner’s intended use for the 
structure, the Lozman Court’s analysis makes clear that the owner’s 
subjective intent should play no role in determining vessel status. 
Instead, Lozman directs courts to look at the structure’s objective 
characteristics, but with an eye to purpose. 
Although the test it proposed is new, Lozman’s effects on admiralty 
                                                                                                                     
 106. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24–26, Lozman 
v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013) (No. 11-626), 2012 WL 1708727, at *24–26 . 
 107. Id. 24 (citations omitted); see also Landau, supra note 56, at 274 (“[T]he objective 
manifestations of an owner’s intent . . . can serve as reliable indicia of the owner’s 
intent. . . . . Thus, by first filtering out watercraft that are physically incapable of maritime 
transportation and second, filtering out watercraft that, based on the owner’s objective 
manifestations, will not engage in maritime transportation, courts can construe vessel status in 
conformity with both Stewart and general maritime law.”). 
 108. 1 A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 16 (1st Am. ed. 1930). 
 109. The reasonable person first appeared in the law of torts before being enlisted by the 
proponents of objectivity in contract interpretation. See Ricketts v. Penn. R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 
761 (2d Cir. 1946) (“The objectivists transferred from the field of torts that stubborn anti-
subjectivist, the ‘reasonable man’; so that, in part at least, advocacy of the ‘objective’ standard 
in contracts appears to have represented a desire for legal symmetry, legal uniformity, a desire 
seemingly prompted by aesthetic impulses.”) (footnotes omitted). A similar desire for legal 
symmetry seems to have motivated the transfer of the reasonable person into maritime law. 
 110. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“A 
contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the 
parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the 
parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.”). 
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jurisdiction may be relatively limited. First, the Supreme Court did not 
overrule Stewart. Instead, the reasonable observer test built on Stewart 
by “offer[ing] guidance in a significant number of borderline cases 
where ‘capacity’ to transport over water is in doubt.”111 This statement 
suggests that lower courts should continue to focus on practical 
capability and should apply the reasonable observer test only when 
capability cannot readily be determined. The Lozman Court also 
emphasized that its criterion was neither necessary nor sufficient for 
vessel status.112 Some structures that look like vessels have been altered 
to make maritime transport practically impossible, and some strange-
looking structures are actually used for maritime transport.113 These 
examples show that satisfying the reasonable observer test is not 
essential for vessel status. This raises the possibility that someone who 
loses on the reasonable observer test can fall back and argue practical 
capability under Stewart, although the factual showing required to 
establish practical capability for a structure that fails the reasonable 
observer test may be very high. As one district court has already 
observed, Lozman “sent a shot across the bow of those lower courts that 
have ‘endorse[d] the “anything that floats” approach’ to defining 
vessels.”114 Although Lozman suggested a more restrictive approach, it 
remains to be seen how far-reaching its effects will be. 
Unfortunately, even if its effects are limited, the reasonable observer 
test is seriously flawed. Most importantly, it fails to give effect to the 
plain meaning of the statute. Moreover, the test threatens to complicate 
admiralty jurisdiction and invite needless litigation over vessel status. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should abandon the reasonable 
observer test and return to the unmodified practical capability test. 
First, the reasonable observer test goes against the plain meaning of 
the statute. The statute reads: “The word ‘vessel’ includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable 
of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”115 As the Court 
noted, the word “contrivance” connotes something designed for a 
purpose, and the context—“watercraft or other artificial contrivance”—
suggests that the purpose must be maritime transport.116 But the crucial 
phrase “capable of being used”117 makes clear that the structure’s 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 745, 2013 AMC 1, 13 (2013). It 
seems clear that “capacity” should be read here as synonymous with “capability.” 
 112. Id. at 745, 2013 AMC at 12. 
 113. See id. at 745–46, 2013 AMC at 12–13. 
 114. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 10-1653, 2013 WL 
311084, at *3, 2013 AMC 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2013) (quoting Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 
743, 2013 AMC at 10). 
 115. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
 116. Id.; Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741–42, 2013 AMC at 7. 
 117. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). 
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intended purpose does not have to be maritime transport as long as the 
structure can be used for that purpose. In short, the statute clearly 
focuses on the structure’s capability. On the other hand, the reasonable 
observer test focuses only on the structure’s intended purpose. Common 
sense tells us that there is a difference between being designed for 
something and being capable of doing something. A heavy book is 
designed for reading but it is capable of being used as a doorstop. A 
distinguished commentator observes that in Stewart the Court read “the 
word ‘practically’ into the statute.”118 That reading was defensible 
based on the statutory definition’s roots in general maritime law.119 In 
this case, the Court rewrote the statute, in effect, by replacing the words 
“capable of being used” with “designed for use.” Even if some early 
authorities point toward the structure’s design or purpose, the text of the 
statute simply cannot bear this meaning. 
Second, applying the reasonable observer test broadly could make 
admiralty jurisdiction more uncertain and open new possibilities for 
wasteful litigation. The test raises more questions than it answers. For 
example, how much does the reasonable observer know about vessel 
design? Is she a naval architect or a layperson? Can she see below the 
waterline or through decks and bulkheads? In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the 
need for clear rules for determining admiralty jurisdiction.120 In 
Grubart, the Court rejected a proposed multifactor test because it 
“would be hard to apply, jettisoning relative predictability for the open-
ended rough-and-tumble of factors, inviting complex argument in a trial 
court and a virtually inevitable appeal.”121 The reasonable observer test 
shares the multifactor test’s uncertainty and manipulability. In fact, the 
reasonable observer is worse than a multifactor test, because while a 
multifactor test at least specifies what factors to take into account, the 
reasonable observer test invites speculation about what factors an 
observer would consider important. And the Lozman Court’s 
consideration of aesthetic as well as functional criteria suggests that the 
range of factors is wide. As the dissent notes, this wide-ranging 
approach “gives [the majority’s] vessel test an ‘I know it when I see it’ 
flavor.”122 Simply put, the reasonable observer test does not give courts 
enough guidance to determine vessel status efficiently. 
If the Court had applied the practical capability test in this case, it 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See Robertson, supra note 55, at 135. 
 119. See Grant, supra note 62, at 338–39. 
 120. 513 U.S. 527, 1995 AMC 913 (1995). 
 121. Id. at 547, 1995 AMC at 929. 
 122. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 752, 2013 AMC 1, 22 (2013) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). 
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would have asked how much the structure was able to carry under tow, 
whether it could carry more than its own furniture and appliances, 
whether it could carry people, and if so, how many—that is, whether the 
structure was practically capable of transporting people and things on 
water. Answering these questions may have required additional fact-
finding.123 Moreover, in cases where there was no actual use—or where, 
as here, the extent of any actual use was unclear—answering these 
questions may involve some speculation. Even so, the practical 
capability test provides sufficient guidance for courts to conduct the 
factual inquiry into a structure’s capability for maritime transport. The 
reasonable observer test may seem to conserve judicial resources 
because it allows the court to make a holistic determination based only 
on the structure’s appearance. If all the court needs is a photograph of 
the structure, then there is no need for detailed fact-finding. But that 
kind of superficial determination may have little or nothing to do with 
the structure’s actual capabilities. On the other hand, the practical 
capability test’s more intensive factual inquiry is both manageable and 
faithful to the statute. 
In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, the United States Supreme 
Court answered the question left open in Stewart about owner intent. 
Lower courts had split on that question. The Fifth Circuit continued to 
consider owner intent as an important factor,124 while the Eleventh 
Circuit refused to consider owner intent—or anything else regarding the 
structure’s purpose.125 Lozman held, in short, that the Eleventh Circuit 
was right in refusing to consider the owner’s subjective intent, but 
wrong in refusing to consider the structure’s objective purpose.126 The 
question is whether a reasonable observer would consider the structure 
to be designed to any practical degree for maritime transport.127 
Unfortunately, the reasonable observer test does not square with the text 
of the statute. Moreover, the test will make admiralty jurisdiction more 
uncertain by complicating the vessel status inquiry. 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Thus, the dissent would have remanded the case. See id. at 754–55, 2013 AMC at 25–
27. 
 124. See De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185, 2006 AMC 2997 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
 125. See Bd. of Comm’rs v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 126. See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744–45, 2013 AMC at 11–12. 
 127. See id. at 741, 2013 AMC at 5. 
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